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DEATH BE NOT PROUD-THE DEMISE OF
DOUBLE INDEMNITY TIME LIMITATIONS
In 1949, the Franklin Life Insurance Company issued Bartholomew
Burne a life insurance policy in the face amount of $15,000. The policy
also contained a double indemnity' rider providing for an accidental
death benefit in the amount of $15,000. This double indemnity provi-
sion contained the usual limitation-that the benefit will be payable only
if death occurred within ninety days of the accident. 2
On January 30, 1959, the insured was accidentally struck by an auto-
mobile while crossing a street in Miami, Florida. The injuries sustained
were severe and only the use of the most sophisticated medical tech-
niques prolonged the insured's life for 4/ years.
The insurer conceded that the injuries sustained were the direct and
sole cause of the insured's death. The face amount of the policy was
paid but the insurer denied liability for the accidental death benefits on
the basis that the policy required that the insured's death occur within
ninety days of the accident.8
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled the ninety-day limitation un-
enforceable in circumstances where no question existed as to the insured's
cause of death.4 Burne v. Franklin Life Insurance Co., 451 Pa. 218,
301 A.2d 799 (1973).
1. A double indemnity provision is defined as "[a] provision in a life insurance
policy, whereby the company agrees to pay twice the face of the contract in case
of accidental death." WEBSTER's NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1957).
However, these benefits "have been variously designated as 'double indemnity,' 'addi-
tional indeminity,' and 'accidental death benefits. . . .' Strictly speaking, the term
'double indemnity' is no longer applicable now that companies . . . are willing to
issue amounts of accidental death benefits which may be a multiple of the policy's
face .... ." D. GREGG, LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE HANDBOOK 269 (2d ed.
1964) [hereinafter cited as GREGG].
2. J. GREIDER AND W. BEADLES, LAW AND THE LIFE INSURANCE CONTRACT 212
(rev. ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as GREIDER AND BEADLES].
3. Supplemental Brief for Appellee at 13, Burne v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 451
Pa. 218, 301 A.2d 799 (1973).
4. A further limitation in the accidental death coverage provided that the bene-
fit would not be paid if death occurred at a time when the premium was being
waived by the insurer. However, no premiums are waived until the insured submits
proof that he has been totally disabled for six months. The court determined that
the waiver of premium exception violated public policy and thus was unenforceable.
451 Pa. at -, 301 A.2d at 801. Furthermore, the majority ruled that the waiver
The purposes of this note are to review briefly significant decisions
which, unlike Burne, have upheld the validity of such time limitations;
to examine the court's justifications for departing from prior decisions;
and to explore the potential ramifications of Burne on insurance under-
writing and claim practices.
Burne is the first decision which sustains the contention that enforce-
ment of the time limitation where there is no question as to the insured's
cause of death violates public policy.
In Mullins v. National Casualty Co.5 the court, under circumstances
similar to those in Burne,6 refused to adopt medical causation as the cri-
terion to be used in determining the insurers liability for double indem-
nity benefits. It did not rule the time limitation provision to be unreason-
able or oppressive. Rather, it upheld the time limitation, observing that
the parties had voluntarily entered into the contract and the contractual
language was clear and unambiguous.
In Douglas v. Southwestern Life Insurance Co. 7 the court enforced the
limitation even though the insured had sustained fatal injuries which,
but for extraordinary medical measures, would have resulted in the in-
sured's death within the time period. Douglas further rejected a conten-
tion that such time limitations unduly influenced the beneficiaries' decision
concerning medical treatment to be given the insured.
The majority in Burne without mentioning either Mullins or Douglas
held that the time limitation violates public policy and propounded two
reasons to support its decision. First, it declared that "to predict liability
under a life insurance policy upon death occurring on or prior to a spe-
cific date . . . offends the basic concepts and fundamental objectives of
life insurance. . ". ." Second, it stated that such a provision "might
. . . encourage something less than the maximum medical care on pen-
alty of financial loss. .... 9
With respect to the first of the aforementioned reasons, two apparent
problems arise. First, the majority in Burne failed to articulate what
"basic concepts and fundamental objectives" might have been contra-
of premium provision when read in conjunction with the ninety-day limitation cre-
ated an ambiguity which would be construed in a light most favorable to the in-
sured. 451 Pa. at -, 301 A.2d at 803.
5. 273 Ky. 686, 117 S.W.2d 928 (1938).
6. In both cases, the insured had sustained serious iniuries which were likely
to be fatal and which did eventually cause the insured's death. However, in both
cases, due to the extraordinary medical measures taken, the death of the insured had
been prolonged beyond the time specified in the policy.
7. 374 S.W.2d 788 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964).
8. 451 Pa. at -, 301 A.2d at 802.
9. Id.
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vened. In support of its ruling, the court offered two observations: the
thought of the "gruesome paradox"'10 which is perceived would result from
a denial of recovery and the observation that the "basic concepts and
fundamental objectives" of life insurance have been breached by such a
time limitation.
The second problem manifested by the majority's public policy ruling
is the negative effect which may result from its literal application in cases
not necessarily involving a double indemnity provision. The manner of
predicting liability-which the court determined offended public policy-
describes not only the ninety-day limitation and age requirement" in a
typical double indemnity provision but includes term insurance as well.' 2
It seems questionable whether the court intended to state its objection to
the ninety-day limitation so broadly that, in doing so, it would cast doubt
upon the validity of the oldest type of life insurance' 3 coverage as well as
other types of time limitations.' 4
An analysis of the majority's second public policy argument, that the
time limitation might adversely affect the insured's chances of receiving
maximum medical care, need not extend beyond a restatement of the
contentions raised by the dissent. Justice Pomeroy in his dissent, argued
that there was nothing in the record of the case to substantiate the ma-
jority's conclusion that a time limitation might have a tendency to en-
courage the beneficiary to deny medical treatment to the insured. He
believed, further, that even if beneficiaries were disposed to deny medi-
cal treatment to the insured because of the financial advantage that would
accrue to them upon the death of the insured within the time stated in
the double indemnity provision, such a disposition probably would not
be abated simply by rejecting the ninety-day limitation.' 5 Thus, the ma-
10. Id. at -, 301 A.2d at 801. The paradox, according to the court, results
in paying accidental death benefits to a beneficiary when the insured has died
-within the time specified in the limitation, but denying recovery to a beneficiary
who incurs more expense and suffers greater agony by prolonging the insured's life.
Id. at -, 301 A.2d at 801-02.
11. Another limitation customarily included in accidental death coverage is that
the insured's death must occur before a specified age. J. MACLEAN, LIFE INSURANCE
244 (9th ed. 1962) [hereinafter cited as MACLEAN].
12. Term Insurance is defined as "[a] . .. policy under which the sum insured
becomes payable only if the person insured dies within a stated period." Id. at
28.
13. GREo, supra note I at 37.
14. Other limitations are incorporated into the double indemnity coverage for
reasons different from the reason for the ninety-day limitation. The age
limitation is inserted primarily to maintain the low cost of double indemnity
coverage since the risk of accidental death increases rapidly in later life. See
MACLEAN, supra note 11.
15. 451 Pa. at -, 301 A.2d at 808-09.
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jority in Burne offered little of substance in support of its conclusion that
the ninety-day limitation violates public policy.
However, the majority in Burne went beyond the argument that public
policy had been violated by operation of the ninety-day limitation. The
court stated categorically that prior decisions upholding the limitation
Were not persuasive since they provide no compelling rationale for apply-
ing the limitation where, as in Burne, no question existed as to the in-
sured's cause of death.16
The rationale that the court found unpersuasive was first articulated
in Brown v. United States Casualty Co. 17 Brown, the insured, sustained
serious injuries upon being thrown from a dogcart. The insurer admitted
that the sole cause of the insured's death was the injuries sustained in the
accident," s yet the insurer denied liability because the death of the insured
occurred beyond the time specified in the policy. The court determined
the limitation to be "reasonable, clear and unambiguous" and, as such, a
bar to recovery of the accidental death benefits. It substantiated its con-
clusion on the basis that the insured had contracted for the insurance with
full awareness of the ninety-day limitation. 19 Such a limitation was rea-
sonable since the final result of an accident, according to experience and
statistics maintained on the subject, could reasonably be expected within
the time alloted in the provision.20 Furthermore, it would be unreason-
able to hold the insurer liable for a death occurring beyond the time spe-
cified in the provision since the premium charged the insured was only
commensurate with the risk that had been assumed by the insurer; that
is, the risk of death resulting within ninety days from the accident. 2'
In Clarke v. Illinois Commercial Men's Ass'n 22 the court attended to
the focal point of concern, the proximate cause of the insured's death. 2'
16. Id. at -, 301 A.2d at 802-03.
17. 95 F. 935 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1899).
18. Id. at 936.
19. Accord, Mullins v. National Cas. Co., 273 Ky. 686, 688, 117 S.W.2d 928,
932 (1938); Hargrave v. Fidelity Mut. Life Ins. Co., 196 Pa. Super. 627, 630, 175
A.2d 912, 914 (1961); Douglas v. Southwestern Life Ins. Co., 374 S.W.2d 788, 793-
94 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964).
20. Accord, Shelton v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y of the United States, 28 Ill.
App. 2d 461, 469, 171 N.E.2d 787, 791 (1961). Cf., Crowe v. North American
Acc. Ins. Co., 96 S.W.2d 670, 671 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936) (thirty-day limitation held
unreasonable time for occurrence of final result of an accident but provision was
neverthless enforced because of its explicit terms).
21. Accord, Bennett v. Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 60 Ga. App. 228, 3 S.E.2d 794
(1939); Hudson v. Mutual Ben. Health & Acc. Ass'n, 184 S.W.2d 188, 189 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1944).
22. 180 M1. App. 300 (1913).
23. Id. at 302-03.
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Since questions as to the cause of the insured's death would inevitably
arise, the court concluded that such a time limitation had been incorpo-
rated into the double indemnity coverage as a method of dealing with
such a question. 24  Such an arrangement was acceptable to the court
upon the theory that if death occurred beyond the time specified in the
provision, it could reasonably be attributed to causes other than the acci-
dent.
In Sidebothom v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.,25 the controlling au-
thority in Pennsylvania prior to Burne on the validity of the time limita-
tion in a double indemnity provision, it was the combined effect of bodily
injuries sustained on three separate occasions which had caused the in-
sured's death. Mrs. Sidebothom, the beneficiary, urged the court to
adopt an interpretation of the ninety-day limitation which would merely
require that there be a bodily injury within ninety days. The Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court ruled that the limitation covered cases involving a
single bodily injury where death occurred beyond the time specified in
the provision, as well as situations involving multiple injuries. The
Burne court discarded Sidebothom because, unlike Burne, the injuries
sustained by the insured in Sidebothom, involved inherent uncertainty as
to their likely results. 26
However, nothing in the opinion of Sidebothom or any other prior
case that dealt with the validity of the time limitation, indicates an inten-
tion to distinguish time limitation cases involving questions of proximate
cause and time limitation cases involving no such question.
Moreover, it would seem that the factual distinction drawn by the
court is questionable for three reasons. First, the court excluded from
consideration cases where, as in Burne, the injury sustained by the in-
sured would be considered fatal. 27  The court in each of those cases ap-
plied the limitation without placing any importance upon whether or not
death was a likely result of the accident. Second, there seems to be little
if any correlation between the factual distinction drawn by the court and
its subsequent ruling that such a provision should not be enforced where
the cause of death is undisputed. Conceivably, a situation could arise
with some initial uncertainty both as to the severity of an accidental
injury and as to whether death will ultimately result. Yet, when death
does ensue it is unquestionably the result of the accidental injury sus-
24. Id. at 303.
25. 339 Pa. 124, 14 A.2d 131 (1940).
26. 451 Pa. at - n.4, 301 A.2d at 802 n.4.
27. Mullins v. National Cas. Co., 273 Ky. 686, 687, 117 S.W.2d 928, 929 (1938);
Douglas v. Southwestern Life Ins. Co., 374 S.W.2d 788, 790 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964).
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tained by the insured. Finally, of the cases cited by the court as sup-
portive of its position, several present a situation where the limitation was
enforced even though the insurer admitted that the insured's death was
accidental. 28
Although the court distinguished past authority, concluding it to be
inapplicable to the facts as presented in Burne, it nevertheless needed
some reason for not applying the limitation. The court provided a ration-
ale by focusing on the supposed purpose of the limitation. The court
concluded that such limitations were incorporated into double indemnity
coverage in order "to govern situations where there existed some pos-
sible uncertainty over whether the injuries sustained in an accident would
actually result in death. ' 29  The court reasoned that, since the injuries
sustained by the insured in Burne were likely to be fatal and since such
a contingency was not within the intended scope of the ninety-day limi-
tation, the limitation, on the basis of well established precedent, should
be disregarded as incapable of reasonable application to the present
facts.30 This aspect of the court's reasoning is not beyond reproach, since
the court's initial premise as to the underlying purpose of the limitation
would appear to be unsupported.31 Furthermore, the dissent contended
that the principle of disregarding a provision, if it cannot reasonably be
applied to the facts, is a rule of law to be invoked only where there exists
28. Spaunhorst v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y of the United States, 88 F.2d 849
(8th Cir. 1937); Brown v. United States Cas. Co., 95 F. 935 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1899).
29. 451 Pa. at -, 301 A.2d at 802.
30. Id. at -, 301 A.2d at 802-03.
31. The Clarke case, 180 Ill. App. 300 (1913), appears to be the only instance
prior to Burne where the court chose to articulate what it understood to be the
purpose of the time limitation. The court concluded that the limitation was in-
tended to provide a method for dealing with questions that might arise over the
insured's cause of death. If death occurred beyond the time specified in the policy,
it could, in all likelihood, be attributed to either prior or intervening causes. See
text accompanying nn. 22-24 supra. Therefore, the severity of the injury and the
fact that the injury did eventually cause the insured's death would be irrelevant in
determining the liability of the insurer if death resulted beyond the time specified
in the policy.
These conflicting interpretations as to the purpose of the ninety-day limitation
should be compared with the following statements: The ninety-day limitation "is
reasonable on practical grounds since, if a long period elapses between an accident
and death, there may be a real question whether the accident was the sole cause
of death." MACLEAN, supra note 11.
"The purpose of this restriction is to assure reasonably that the accident was the
sole cause of the death." S. HUEBNER AND K. BLACK JR., LIFE INSURANCE 200 (8th
ed. 1972).
The ninety-day limitation "is intended primarily to reduce problems that may
arise when the intervening time lapse might make it doubtful that the injury was
the true cause of death." GREIDER AND BEADLES, supra note 2.
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some question as to the intention of the parties, a situation the dissent
felt was not present in Burne.32
Assuming that the court's conclusion as to the purpose of such limita-
tions was correct and that they should not be applied in cases with facts
similar to Burne, the court failed to show why medical causation should
be the criterion used to determine the insurer's liability. Therefore, not
only was the court's departure from past authority questionable, it predi-
cated its determination that such clauses are unreasonable upon two weak
premises: an interpretation of the purpose of such limitations which ap-
pears to be unsupported, and a line of precedent which arguably does
not apply to the facts as presented in Burne.
It is proper, at this point, both to examine certain factors not considered
by the Burne court, and to evaluate the court's rationale for ignoring the
time limitation. The court in Burne raised the question, but did not
hold, that the reasonableness of the limitation may be suspect in light of
modem medical advances. This analysis will begin by focusing on this
unanswered question. 'In Brown, the court ruled that the time specified
in the provision was a "fair length of time for the final result of an ac-
cident . . ... , In the 100 years since this rationale was first pro-
pounded, modem medicine has become quite adept at prolonging life.3 4
Therefore, if ninety days is not already an unfair amount of time to allow
for the final result of an accident, it would, assuming medical research
continues to grow, eventually become so. One method to obviate this
problem would be to increase the number of days within which the acci-
dental death must result. While ninety days is the usual time for such a
limitation,"5 there are other periods386 and it does not seem beyond com-
prehension that one of the reasons for companies offering a longer time
period has been a recognition by them of such medical advances. How-
ever, simply extending the period of time is not the optimal solution, for
eventually the advances of medicine would cast doubt upon the reason-
ableness of this new period. The decision in Burne avoids this pitfall
32. 451 Pa. at -, 301 A.2d at 806-08.
33. 95 F. at 937.
34. Artificial respirators, blood-matching, antibiotics, artificial valves and trans-
fusion systems are but a few examples of the modern equipment and techniques
that may be utilized to keep an accident victim alive. See generally TIME, July
16, 1973, at 36-37.
35. GREIDER AND BEADLES, supra note 2.
36. The accidental death benefit provision in life insurance policies issued by
the New York Life Insurance Company contain 120-day time limitations, while 180-
day limitations are provided in similar coverage offered by the Massachusetts Mu-
tual Life Insurance Company.
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by focusing its attention on actual causation rather than on an arbitrary
time limitation.
Another reason advanced by many of the courts which have held the
time limitation to be reasonable takes the form of a categorical pro-
nouncement that such a limitation was within the contemplation of the
parties.3 7  However, the time stated within the provision is not reached
by process of negotiation between the parties but is a standard time
which the individual must accept if he desires the accidental death pro-
tection. Can it be said that the time limitation was voluntarily38 con-
tracted for or that the individual desirous of obtaining accidental death
protection intended to exclude such recovery simply because of the mis-
fortune of having his life prolonged, although death was unquestionably
the result of an accident?3 9
Decisions have also based the reasonableness of such a limitation upon
a conclusion that statistics were kept on the number of deaths which
occur within the time limitation and that these statistics then provided
the basis for calculation of the premium to be charged the insured.
4 0
The dissent accepted as fact that "insurance companies .. . set their
37. Clarke v. Ill. Commercial Men's Ass'n, 180 Ill. App. 300 (1913); Douglas
v. Southwestern Life Ins. Co., 374 S.W.2d 788 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964).
38. The beneficiary in Burne contended that the double indemnity agreement
was a "classic example of a 'contract of adhesion,'" in which there was no "arms
length" bargaining over the terms to be included in such coverage. As a result,
the deceased had no opportunity to render the provision inapplicable "where the
historical basis for the clause is not present...." Supplemental Brief for Appel-
lant at 16-20, Burne v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 451 Pa. 218, 301 A.2d 799 (1973).
39. GREMER AND BEADLES, supra note 2, at 213. In assessing the validity of
the time limitation, the Burne court could have inquired as to whether, under the
circumstances, the time limitation was within the reasonable expectations of the
applicant. Professor Keeton in his article, Insurance Law Rights At Variance With
Policy Provisions, 83 HARV. L. REV. 961 (1970), states this principle as the follow-
ing:
The objectively reasonable expectations of applicants and intended bene-
ficiaries regarding the terms of insurance contracts will be honored even
though painstaking study of the policy provisions would have negated those
expectations.
Id. at 967.
However, the precise circumstances which would allow application of the Doc-
trine of Reasonable Expectations are in dispute. While Professor Keeton would ap-
ply the principle very liberally, others have suggested that it be confined to situa-
tions where the extent of the policy's coverage is unclear. Perlet, The Insurance
Contract and the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectation, 6 FORUM 116 (1971);
Squires, A Skeptical Look at the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectation, 6 FORUM 252
(1971).
40. Brown v. United States Cas. Co., 95 F. 935 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1899); Bennett
v. Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 60 Ga. App. 228, 3 S.E.2d 794 (1939); Hudson v. Mutual
Ben. Health & Acc. Ass'n, 184 S.W.2d 188 (Mo. Ct. App. 1944).
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rates in reliance on the actuarial statistics and other data pertaining to
deaths within 90 days."'4 ' However, what was initially stated as a
presumption 42 on the part of the court and later articulated as fact 43 has
little basis in reality, for it would seem that no such statistics exist.44
Finally, the contention is made that to allow medical causation to de-
termine liability would be to open the courts to a flood of litigation re-
garding the cause of the insured's death.45  Three factors militate against
supporting such a conclusion. First, the essence of the insurance con-
tracted for is to provide against an accidental death. It would seem to
be more logical to focus upon medical causation rather than on whether
the insured died within a specific number of days. Even though past
decisions upheld the time limitation as a suitable substitute for an actual
determination of the insured's cause of death, such a conclusion was
grounded on a number of assumptions pertaining to the limitation's rea-
sonableness, some of which, as this note has attempted to show, seem
questionable. Second, while there appear to be no statistics maintained
upon the number of cases in which accidental death results outside the
41. 451 Pa. at -, 301 A.2d at 809.
42. Brown v. United States Cas. Co., 95 F.2d 935, 937 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1899).
43. Bennett v. Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 60 Ga. App. 228, 3 S.E.2d 794 (1939); Har-
grave v. Fidelity Mut. Life Ins. Co., 196 Pa. Super. 627 (1961). See Comment,
Insurance-Effect of Death More Than 90-days After Accident, Under Double In-
deminity Policy, 35 ILL. B.J. 169 (1946).
44. One of two methods is used in determining the premium for accidental
death benefits. The insurer may charge a flat rate per $1,000 of insurance irres-
pective of the insured's age, or the insurer may base his premium rate upon the
"Intercompany Accidental Death Table." This table bases the rate upon the exper-
ience of a group of companies during the period of 1926 to 1933. In 1959 a new
table based on the period 1951 to 1956 was published. MACLEAN, supra note 11,
at 245. Nothing within this authority suggests that actuarial statistics based upon
the number of deaths which occur within the ninety-day period are maintained.
In response to a questionnaire, the following insurance companies replied to the
DePaul Law Review that they maintained no statistics on the number of deaths
that occurred within the time specified in the time limitation: (1) John Hancock
Mutual Life Insurance Company, (2) The Equitable Life Assurance Society of the
United States, (3) The Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Company. Letters on file
in the offices of the DePaul Law Review.
Insurance companies that predicate their rates on the "Intercompany Accidental
Death Table" may argue that their rates are determined with reference to ,the
ninety-day limitation, since the experience for that table was accumulated with the
ninety-day limitation in effect. However, since no actual statistics are maintained
reflecting the instances where the individual died within the time limitation or where
the insurer waived the provision, it is difficult to say that these rates would have
been different had the limitation not been in operation.
45. Supplemental Brief for Appellee at 6, Burne v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 451
Pa. 218, 301 A.2d 799 (1973).
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time limitation, the number of such cases is likely to be few.46 Finally,
the practice is not uncommon in the insurance industry for a company to
maintain an in-house policy of waiving the ninety-day provision where
no question exists as to the cause of the insured's death.4 7 Perhaps such
a policy of waiving the time limitation is tacit recognition on the part of
the insurer that medical causation is a better approach to determining
whether an insured is entitled to recover accidental death benefits.
Thus, Burne is not only a reasonable result but the better approach to
determine the insurer's liability for double indemnity benefits where no
question exists as to the insured's cause of death.
Concerning the future judicial treatment of such time limitations one
can only speculate as to the effect Burne will have on the underwriting
or claim practices of the insurance industry as a whole. It is unlikely
that insurers will change their policies to substitute medical causation for
the time limitation. Rather, they will leave their policies undisturbed,
preferring to rely upon the overwhelming weight of authority contrary to
Burne. Such a posture by the insurer places a burden upon a beneficiary
of determining the likelihood of a court following the ruling in Burne.
However, under factual situations similar to the one presented in Burne
where death is clearly the result of the accident and the amount of the
benefit is nominal, it would not seem unlikely to see an increased tend-
ency of waiving the ninety-day limitation rather than litigating the issue
of its enforceability. It is also unlikely that the decision in Burne will
result in any increase in the cost of life insurance because the premium
charged for double indemnity coverage makes up only a small part of
the total life insurance cost structure.48
46. The Department of Policy Claims of the Equitable Life Assurance Society
of the United States stated that, while the company maintains
no statistics on the number of cases processed which invoke the waiver or
invoking of the 90-day clause, . . . from experience I would venture to es-
timate that not more than nine or ten cases a year turn on this question.
Incidentally we process some 1600 accidental death cases a year.
Letter from W.A. Narducci to the DePaul Law Review, Aug. 14, 1973, on file in
the offices of the DePaul Law Review.
47. GREIDER AND BEADLES, supra note 2, at 213. In response to a questionnaire,
several major companies acknowledge that they in fact would, under certain circum-
stances, honor a claim for double indemnity benefits where the insured had died
beyond the time specified in the policy. They emphasized that there were no set
guidelines as to what circumstances would lead to a waiver of the ninety-day limita-
tion, since the validity of each claim had to be decided on a case-by-case basis.
Letters on file in the offices of the DePaul Law Review.
48. MACLEAN, supra note 11, at 241-42; D. BICKELHAUPT AND J. MAGEE, GEN-
ERAL INSuRANCE 720 (8th ed. 1970).
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While cynics will note Burne as just another instance of a court ignor-
ing the clear and unambiguous language of a policy provision, the deci-
sion is significant for what it may bring about. It may urge other juris-
dictions to reexamine rationales espoused in support of the validity of the
time limitations, which in far too many instances were but perfunctorily
applied.
Gregory M. White
